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 Telemarketing, to many people, is nothing more than a nuisance 
and an unwanted intrusion upon home life. Yet for many non-profit 
charities, it represents the most effective way to inform people of their 
causes, and to raise money. Recently, in National Coalition of Prayer 
v. Carter, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit curtailed 
the speech that these charities can express.1 Rather than use the 
standard of scrutiny outlined by the Supreme Court to deal with 
regulations on charitable speech, the Seventh Circuit used a balancing 
test that has not been used since the case which created it was decided 
thirty-five years ago.2 The test, which dealt with a commercial 
restriction, simply weighed the governmental interest of protecting 
personal privacy against the free speech rights of the charities.3 In 
using this test, the Seventh Circuit circumvented what the concurrence 
calls the “firmly-established narrow tailoring requirement.”4 While the 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A. History, December 2002, University of St. Thomas. 
1 See Nat’l Coal. of Prayer, Inc., v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2006). 
2 Id.; see Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728 (1970). 
3 Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736-37   
4 Carter, 455 F.3d at 792 (William, J., concurring). 
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decision upholding the constitutionality of the statute was not 
necessarily incorrect, the Seventh Circuit’s rationale for so holding 
was incorrect. The right to free speech is a bedrock principle in our 
society, and the restraint of it deserves a proper test. This Comment 
contends that the Seventh Circuit, going against precedent, used the 
wrong level of scrutiny in its recent decision Carter.5  
 Section I of this Comment will describe the facts and rationale 
behind the majority’s opinion in Carter, Section II will relate the 
relevant precedent and case law, Section III will argue the court went 
against this precedent in its application of the balancing test, Section 
IV will argue that, even if the court had not misinterpreted precedent, 
the application of Rowan was incorrect given the distinguishing facts 
between the two cases, finally Section V will argue that by applying 
Rowan, the Seventh Circuit restrained charitable speech without 
proper analysis. 
 
I.  THE FACTS AND REASONING BEHIND THE MAJORITY’S OPINION IN 
NATIONAL COALITION OF PRAYER V. CARTER 
 
On any given day, more than 300,000 operators employed by 
various telemarketing firms are working to contact over 18 million 
people.6 Telemarketing is undoubtedly a powerful and enormously 
successful tool, but the majority of the public considers it an irritant.7 
This public backlash has manifested itself in federal and state laws 
                                                 
5 For the test the majority used see Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736-37. 
6 Augusta Meacham, To Call or Not to Call? An Analysis of Current 
Charitable Telemarketing Regulations, 12 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 61, 61 (2004) 
(citing Edwin L. Klett & Rochelle L. Brightwell, Exercise in Free Speech or Just a 
Pain in the Neck?, 24 PA. LAW. 38, 38 (2002)). 
7 Studies show that only .1% of the population likes to receive unsolicited calls 
and 69% of people find telemarketing offensive. See Hilary B. Miller & Robert R. 
Biggerstaff, Application of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act to Intrastate 
Telemarketing Calls and Faxes, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 667, 686 (2000) (citations 
omitted). 
2
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directed at stopping what is seen as an intrusion upon the privacy of 
the home.8 The Indiana statute was enacted for this precise reason.9  
In 2001, Indiana enacted the Indiana Telephone Privacy Act 
(“the Act”), which established a statewide do-not-call list.10 The Act 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6101-08; N.D. Cent. Code § 51-28 (2006). 
9 The statue in relevant part states:  
A telephone solicitor may not make or cause to be made a 
telephone sales call to a telephone number if that telephone 
number appears in the most current quarterly listing published by 
the division. 
Ind. Code § 24-4.7-4-1 (2006).  However, the Act does not apply 
to any of the following: 
(1) A telephone call made in response to an express request of the 
person called.  
(2) A telephone call made primarily in connection with an existing 
debt or contract for which payment or performance has not been 
completed at the time of the call. 
(3) A telephone call made on behalf of a charitable organization 
that is exempt from federal income taxation under Section 501 of 
the Internal Revenue Code, but only if all of the following apply: 
  (A) The telephone call is made by a volunteer or an employee of 
the charitable organization. 
  (B) The telephone solicitor who makes the telephone call 
immediately discloses all of the following information upon 
making contact with the consumer: 
     (i) The solicitor's true first and last name. 
     (ii) The name, address, and telephone number of the charitable 
organization. 
(4) A telephone call made by an individual licensed under Ind. 
Code 25-34.1 if: 
  (A) the sale of goods or services is not completed; and 
  (B) the payment or authorization of payment is not required; 
until after a face to face sales presentation by the seller. 
(5) A telephone call made by an individual licensed under IC 27-1-
15.6 or IC 27-1-15.8 when the individual is soliciting an 
application for insurance or negotiating a policy of insurance on 
behalf of an insurer (as defined in Ind. Code 27-1-2-3). 
(6) A telephone call soliciting the sale of a newspaper of general 
circulation, but only if the telephone call is made by a volunteer or 
an employee of the newspaper.  
Ind. Code § 24-4.7-1-1 (emphasis added). 
3
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allowed residents of Indiana to place their telephone numbers on this 
list and shield themselves from telephone solicitors.11 Under the Act, 
commercial telemarketers were completely prohibited from calling any 
resident who placed their number on the do-not-call list.12 The Act, 
however, exempted certain calls, most particularly those placed by 
charitable organizations exempt from federal income taxation under 
Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code.13 Organizations falling 
under this category are exempt provided that the “telephone call is 
made by a volunteer or an employee of the charitable organization 
[and] the telephone solicitor who makes the telephone call 
immediately discloses. . . [his or her] true first and last name [and t]he 
name, address, and telephone number of the charitable organization.”14 
In January 2002, Indiana commissioned a professional survey 
to study the Act’s effectiveness.15 The survey found that calls by 
telemarketers to numbers registered on the do-not-call list fell from an 
average of 12.1 per week to 1.9 per week.16 Additionally, “[n]early 
98% of the residents who had registered their telephone numbers 
reported receiving ‘less’ or ‘much less’ telemarketing interruption 
since the Act become law.”17 
                                                                                                                   
10 Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 785 (7th Cir. 2006). 
11 Id. “Telephone Solicitor” is defined in the act as: “[A}n individual, a firm, 
an organization, a partnership, an association, or a corporation. Ind. Code Ann § 
24.7-2-10. 
12 Ind. Code § 24-4.7-4-1. 
13 Carter, 455 F.3d at 784. Ind. Code § 24-4.7-4-1(3). “The Indiana Attorney 
General recognizes an ’implicit exclusion’ for calls soliciting political contributions. 
Carter, 455 F.3d at 784. Beyond this, the ITPA specifically allows for exceptions to 
the do-not-call list in two other circumstances: (1) it allows newspapers to solicit 
sales through telemarketing, as long as the call is made by a volunteer or employee; 
and (2) the act permits licensed real estate agents or insurance agents to call numbers 
on the do-not-call list under specified circumstances. Ind. Code § 24-4.7-1-1(6) and 
24.7-1-1(4) and (5), Carter, 455 F.3d at 784. 
14 Carter, 455 F.3d at 784 (quoting Ind. Code § 24-4.7-1-1(3)). 
15 Id. at 785. 
16 Id. 
17 Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 785 (7th. Cir. 2006). 
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The effectiveness of the Act has lead to an increasing number 
of Indiana residents registering their numbers.18 In May of 2003 
approximately half of Indiana’s residential lines had been registered on 
the list, and by late 2005 that number had increased by another 
500,000.19 
Plaintiffs, all tax-exempt charities, brought suit alleging that 
the prohibition against using professional telemarketing firms to solicit 
donations violated their First Amendment rights.20 In cross motions for 
summary judgment, the district court for the Southern District of 
Indiana, Indianapolis Division found in favor of the state, and the 
Plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit.21 
On appeal the Plaintiffs argued, among other things, that the 
regulation was content-based and should be subjected to strict scrutiny 
under United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. 22 In 
                                                 




22 Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2006); The 
Plaintiffs’ first argument, which is not being discussed in this paper, was that they 
had standing to challenge the entire act, not only the exemptions which applied to 
them. This assertion was based on two arguments, (1) that the provisions aimed at 
commercial speakers showed the “real purpose” of the Act, and (2) commercial 
speakers may not be treated more favorably than charitable speakers. Id. The 
plaintiffs’ contended in the first argument that the exemptions directly injured the 
them because they showed the true motive of the Act, which was to “suppress 
‘reviled speakers vis-à-vis more favored speakers.” Id. (citing City of Cincinnati v. 
Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410 (1993)). In Discovery the city passed a law 
regulating newsracks for the supposed purposed of clearing the sidewalks of the 
numerous newsracks. Id. An exemption for non-commercial handbills however, 
allowed 1,438 of the 1.500 newsracks to remain. Id. This exemption was so broad as 
to render the legislation ineffective, and bore no relationship to the city’s asserted 
interests, the Court therefore struck the statute down. Id. The plaintiffs argued that 
Discovery held that “exceptions within an ordinance can show an impermissible 
‘true reason’ behind legislation, and any disfavored plaintiff can request the Act be 
invalidated on that basis.” Id. The Court dismissed this argument stating “[t]h case 
stands for the proposition that commercial speech cannot lightly be singled out as 
‘less valuable’ than other speech, and that restrictions on commercial speech, like 
5
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Playboy the U.S. Supreme Court dealt with a federal act aimed at 
preventing “signal bleed” – when the partial or full portions of audio 
or video can be seen from scrambled porn channels.23 The act in 
question required cable operators to limit the transmission of the signal 
to hours when children were not likely to be watching.24 Since the 
restrictions the act placed on the transmission of the channels were 
based on the type of content those channels transmitted, the Court 
found the restrictions to be “content based” and subject to strict 
scrutiny.25 
The concurrence argued that it was not a content based 
regulation, as the Plaintiff urged, because it was a “’regulation that 
serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression . . . even if it has 
an incidental effect on certain speakers or messages but not others.’”26 
Similarly, the majority found this argument unconvincing, but did not 
address why they found the statute not to be content-based, instead 
they adopted the level of scrutiny the state suggested, which required 
no such analysis.27 
                                                                                                                   
restrictions on ‘core’ First Amendment speech, must directly further a legitimate 
state interest.”  Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 The second standing argument was based on the holding in Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, where the Supreme Court held that a commercial speaker has the 
standing to assert non-commercial speakers’ rights. 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973). The 
plaintiffs argued this case was the converse, where a non-commercial speaker is 
asserting the rights of a commercial speaker. Carter, 455 F.3d at 786. The court, 
however, rejected this argument and held that commercial speakers have standing to 
assert the rights of non-commercial speakers because the court presumes that speech 
accorded greater protection, namely non-commercial speech, will create a stronger 
case against regulation. Id. Since restrictions on commercial speech must meet a 
lower standard of review, the plaintiffs are not being treated less favorably if they are 
allowed to challenge the restrictions which must meet a higher standard, those 
affecting non-commercial speech. Id.  
23 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 806 (2000). 
24 Id. at 806. 
25 Id. at 813 
26 Id. at 798-99 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) 
(William, J., concurring). 
27 Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 787-77 (7th Cir.2006). 
6
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The State urged the Seventh Circuit to apply a less traditional 
level of scrutiny outlined in the thirty-five year-old Supreme Court 
decision Rowan v. United States Postal Service.28 The State’s 
argument, which the court eventually adopted, stated that since 
Indiana’s statute, aimed at protecting residential privacy, allowed 
residents to “opt-in” by placing themselves on a statewide do-not-call 
list the only determination the court needed to make was whether the 
State’s interest in protecting residential privacy outweighed “the 
speaker’s right to communicate his or her message into private 
homes.”29 
The concurrence, however, was unconvinced by both the 
Plaintiff and the majority, and argued for a different level of scrutiny 
outlined in the Supreme Court case Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens 
for a Better Environment30, and the subsequent Supreme Court cases 
interpreting it.31 The Supreme Court in Schaumburg held that 
regulations affecting charitable speech must be narrowly tailored to 
advance a sufficiently strong governmental interest, without 
unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment Freedoms.32 Rowan, 
the concurrence argued, must be read not as establishing a stand-alone 
test which requires a mere balancing of the parties’ interests, but rather 
as only an example of the substantial privacy rights of residents in 
their homes, and as support that an opt-in statute protecting that right 
can be narrowly tailored.33 Further, the concurrence maintained that by 
employing the Rowan balancing test, the majority circumvents the 
principle of narrow tailoring analysis, and departs from firmly 
                                                 
28 397 U.S. 728; Carter, 455 F.3d at 787. 
29 Carter, 455 F.3d at 787. 
30 444 U.S. 620 (1980). 
31 The other cases interpreting Schaumburg were Sec’y of Maryland v. Joseph 
H. Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984) and Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 
Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
32 Carter, 455 F.3d at 793 (citing Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636-37). 
33 Carter, 455 F.3d at 794. 
7
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established “bedrock constitutional principles pertaining to charitable 
speech.”34 
 
II.  RELEVANT CASE LAW CONCERNING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
 
A.  Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulations on Free Speech 
 
In Carter, the plaintiffs argued that the Act is a “content-based 
regulation because its applicability requires analysis of the content of 
the message in order to determine to which callers it applies.”35 While 
the majority rejects this argument with little comment, the concurrence 
devotes some analysis to it, and indeed finds the question of whether 
the Indiana Act is a content neutral regulation is a close one.36 It is 
therefore relevant to briefly discuss the issue of content neutrality. 
The Supreme Court has outlined different levels of scrutiny for 
restrictions on free speech based on the type of speech that is being 
restrained, or the manner in which the speech is being regulated. One 
of the distinctions the Supreme Court has drawn is whether the 
regulation is content-neutral or content-based. In a content-based 
regulation, the government seeks to restrict speech based on the 
content of the message37, and is presumptively invalid and subject to 
strict scrutiny.38 
                                                 
34 Id. at 792. 
35 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 21, Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, No. 05-
3995 (7th Cir. July, 28, 2006). 
36 Carter, 455 F.3d at 798-99. 
37 Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). Examples 
of content based regulations include, Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1988) 
(finding that a statute prohibiting the display of signs critical to foreign governments 
within 500 feet of that government’s embassy was content-based because “[w]hether 
individuals may picket in front of a foreign embassy depends entirely upon whether 
their picket signs are critical of the foreign government or not”); Simon Schuster, 
Inc., v. N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115-16 (1991) (illustrating the 
presumptive invalidity of content based regulations, the Court found a law that 
required income earned by a convicted criminal from published works describing 
his/her crime to be donated to a victim compensation fund was content based 
8
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 A content neutral speech restriction is one that regulates 
without reference to the content of the speech.39 Rather, they regulate 
through time, place, and manner restrictions of the speech at issue. 
These regulations are not content-based even if they have an incidental 
effect on the speakers.40 The test for content-neutral regulations is 
intermediate judicial scrutiny, and was outlined by the Court in United 
States v. O'Brien.41 A content-neutral regulation is justified if it  (1) is 
within the constitutional powers of the government, (2) furthers an 
important or substantial governmental interest, (3) the government 
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, and (4) is an 
incidental restriction on free speech that is no greater than essential.42 
 
B.  The Level of Scrutiny Afforded Regulations on Commercial Speech 
 
If, however, the regulation is content-based, it may still be 
constitutional, and not be strict scrutiny, if it falls into one of the lower 
                                                                                                                   
because it imposed a financial burden on speakers because of the content of their 
speech).  
38 Strict scrutiny requires that the government have a compelling government 
interest, and the statute in question be narrowly tailored to further that interest. 
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). “If a statute 
regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a 
compelling Government interest. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 
115, 126, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989). If a less restrictive alternative 
would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative. 
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) ("[The CDA's Internet indecency 
provisions'] burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives 
would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was 
enacted to serve"); Sable Commc’ns, supra, at 126,  ("The Government may ... 
regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a 
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated 
interest"). To do otherwise would be to restrict speech without an adequate 
justification, a course the First Amendment does not permit.” Playboy, 529 U.S. at 
813. 
39 Barry, 485 U.S. at 320. 
40 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
41 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
42 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
9
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valued forms of speech.43 Commercial speech is one such form of 
speech. At one time, commercial speech had no first amendment 
protection.44 In Valentine, the Court held that government cannot 
“unduly burden” the freedom of speech, yet observed that “[w]e are 
equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restrain on 
government as respects purely commercial advertising.”45  
This early hesitance to apply first amendment protections to 
commercial speech is shown in Rowan. Indiana’s statute is not the first 
state or federal statute intended to protect the privacy of the home 
from unwanted intrusion.46 While telemarketing has been the recent 
target of legislation, other methods of commercial speech were 
targeted earlier. Rowan, the case which the majority in Carter relies on 
for its balancing test, was one of the first cases dealing with this issue. 
In 1967 Title III of the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act allowed 
householders to insulate themselves from advertisements that were 
deemed “erotically arousing or sexually provocative.”47 Once the 
householder had sent notice to the Postmaster General requesting the 
sender of such mailings to stop all future advertisements, the sender 
was required to delete the address from all mailing lists owned or 
controlled by the sender.48 
                                                 
43 Kerri L. Keller, The Supreme Court Sends First Amendment Guarantees Up 
In Smoke By Applying the Commercial Speech Doctrine to Content-Based 
Regulations,  36 AKRON L. REV. 133, 140 (2002). Forms of low value speech include 
fighting words, incitements-to-riot, and obscenity. Kerri L. Keller, The Supreme 
Court Sends First Amendment Guarantees Up In Smoke By Applying the 
Commercial Speech Doctrine to Content-Based Regulations,  36 AKRON L. REV. 
133, 140 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); Whitney 
v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 379 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring); and Miller, 423 
U.S. at 26).  Forms of high value speech include political, literary, artistic, and 
scientific speech. Id. (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973).  
44 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942).  
45 Id. 
46 See the federal telemarketing statute 15 U.S.C. § 6101-08; Schaumburg v. 
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) 
47 Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728, 729-30 (1970). 
48 Id. 
10
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As mentioned above, the Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the statute based on a test which weighed the mailer’s right to send 
against the homeowner’s right to prevent unwanted communication 
from entering the household.49 “Weighing the highly important right to 
communicate. . . against the very basic right to be free from sights, 
sounds, and tangible matter we do not want, it seems to us that a 
mailer’s right to communicate must stop at the mailbox of an 
unreceptive addressee.”50 
The two major factors in the Court’s decision to weigh in favor 
of the homeowner were the plenary power of the homeowner under the 
Act, and the affirmative action required by the homeowner. In an 
opinion that extensively analyzed in depth the legislative history and 
prior versions of the Act, the Court found that the opt-in nature of the 
Act effectively permitted “a citizen to erect a wall that no advertiser 
may penetrate without his acquiescence.”51 This “wall” the 
homeowner was allowed to erect could essentially block an unlimited 
amount of commercial mailings from being delivered to the citizen’s 
home.52 Because the Act required the homeowner to simply state that, 
in her subjective viewpoint, the mailings were erotic in nature, the 
homeowner could conceivably “prohibit the mailing of a dry goods 
catalog because he objects to the contents.”53 This sweeping power, 
along with the required affirmative action of opting-in by the 
homeowner, placed the Postmaster General in an acceptable 
“ministerial” role. The Act did not require the Postmaster General to 
decide which of the sender’s mailings were erotic, but simply carried 
out the wishes of the homeowner, making it only an enforcing or 
ministerial role. 
The statute at issue in Rowan was content based, because it 
only allowed the homeowner to bar commercial advertisements from 
entering his mailbox, making the applicability of the statute based 
                                                 
49 Id. at 737. 
50 Id. at 736-37 
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upon content of the speakers’ message; yet consistent with their case 
law to date, the Court did not analyze it under strict scrutiny.54 
Following Rowan, a series of cases changed the level of 
scrutiny applied to restrictions on commercial speech. In Bigelow v. 
Virginia, the Court first recognized that commercial speech is entitled 
to some first amendment protection.55 This protection was defined and 
extended in subsequent cases56, but it was not until the Court decided 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission57 
that the current governing test for first amendment challenges to 
commercial speech was established.58 
In Central Hudson, the Court articulated a four prong test to 
analyze the constitutionality of a restriction on commercial speech; (1) 
the commercial speech must concern a lawful activity, and not be 
misleading,(2) there must be a substantial government interest; (3) the 
proposed regulation must directly advance the substantial government 
interest; and (4) the proposed regulation must be no more extensive 
than necessary to advance the government interest.59 
Following Central Hudson, the court decided Board of 
Trustees of State University of New York v. Fox, and Cincinnati v. 
                                                 
54 The Court in Rowan did not face a content-based argument, and therefore 
did not address whether the statute was content-based or not, but subsequent cases 
have found that the statute was content-based. See S. Suburban Housing Ctr. v. 
Greater S. Suburban 935 F.2d 868, 894 (1991). 
55 See 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983). The Bigelow Court balanced the public 
interest in receiving information against the state’s interest in preventing the 
commercial speech. Kerri L. Keller, The Supreme Court Sends First Amendment 
Guarantees Up In Smoke By Applying the Commercial Speech Doctrine to Content-
Based Regulations,  36 AKRON L. REV. 133, 140 (2002) (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 
421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975)). 
56 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748 (1976). 
57 447 U.S. 557, (1980) 
58 Joshua A. Marcus, Commercial Speech on the Internet: Spam and the First 
Amendment, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 245, 253 (1998). 
59 Cent. Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 566 (1980). 
12
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Discovery Network.60 In Fox, the Court held that a restriction is 
narrowly tailored within the context of the Central Hudson test if there 
is a reasonable “fit” between the regulation and legislature’s intent.61 
This decision seemed to weaken the narrow tailoring requirement of 
Central Hudson, since it only required a reasonable fit. However, 
Discovery Network emphasized the value of commercial speech under 
the reasonable fit requirement.62 In Discovery the city passed a law 
regulating commercial newsracks with the supposed purpose of 
clearing the sidewalks of the numerous newsracks.63 Non-commercial 
newsracks, however, constituted 1,438 of the 1.500 newsracks on the 
streets.64 There was no reasonable fit, since this exemption was so 
broad as to render the legislation ineffective, and bore no relationship 
to the city’s asserted interests.65 
Under current case law, the Central Hudson approach is the 
governing test for all restrictions on commercial speech.66 The fourth 
prong of the Central Hudson test is satisfied when there is a 
reasonable fit, as defined by Fox and Discovery, between the 
restriction and the purposed governmental interest behind it. 
 
                                                 
60 492 U.S. 469 (1989); 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
61 “What our decisions require is a ‘‘fit’ between the legislature’s ends, and the 
means chosen to accomplish those ends,’ a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but 
reasonable[.]” Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 (citing Posadas v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 
328, 341 (1986)). 
62 “’In the area of noncommercial speech, content-based restrictions. . . are 
sustained only in the most extraordinary circumstances. . . By contrast, regulation of 
commercial speech based upon content is less problematic.’ While that statement 
remains true today as the continued viability of the Cent. Hudson test shows, we 
cannot say that the difference in value between commercial speech and 
noncommercial speech is as great as it was before Discovery Network.” Pearson v. 
Edgar, 153 F.3d 397, 404-05 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Curtis v. Thompson, 840 F.3d 
1291, 1297-98 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
63 Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 418 (1993). 
64 Id. at 418. 
65 Id. at 424-28. 
66 Thompson v. Cent. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002). 
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C.  The Level of Scrutiny Afforded Restrictions on Charitable 
Speech 
  
 After the Court had extended first amendment protection to 
commercial speech, the Court faced a series of challenges to laws 
regulating charitable speech. In a succession of cases upholding the 
challenges to these restrictions, the Supreme Court defined the method 
of review for a restriction on charitable speech.67 While the Court did 
not directly face a challenge to the constitutionality of an opt-in 
regulation on charitable speech directed at protecting privacy within 
the home, this “trilogy” of cases tackling on other restrictions on 
charitable speech can be read as establishing the level of scrutiny that 
must be applied to such restrictions.68 It is this trilogy of cases, the 
concurrence argues, which provides the controlling test for content-
neutral restrictions on charitable speech.69 
  
1.  Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment 
  
The first case to give protection under the first amendment for 
charitable speech was Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better 
Environment.70 In Schaumburg an ordinance requiring any charity 
soliciting door-to-door or on-street for contributions was required to 
use at least 75% of their receipts for “charitable purposes”.71 In an 
                                                 
67 See Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); 
Sec’y of Maryland v. Munson, 467 U.S. 947 (1984); and Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the 
Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
68   Judge Williams refers to these cases as a trilogy in his concurrence in 
Carter, but the name has been used in many other scholarly writings and opinions.  
See Rita Marie Cain, Nonprofit Solicitation Under the Telemarketing Sales Rule, 57 
Fed. Comm. L.J. 81, 89 (2004); John T. Haggerty, Begging and the Public Forum 
Doctrine in the First Amendment, 34 B.C. L. REV. 1121, 1132 (1993); Edward J. 
Schoen, Joseph S. Falchek, The Do-Not-Call Registry Trumps Commercial Speech, 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 483, 524 (2005). 
69 Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 792-93 (2006) (William, J., 
concurring). 
70 444 U.S. 620 (1980). 
71 Id. at 622. 
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extensive review of relevant precedent the Supreme Court held that 
charitable solicitations, while open to limitations, are a protected form 
of speech subject to a higher form of First Amendment protection than 
that afforded commercial speech.72 Charitable solicitations are 
acknowledged to be commercial in some manner, but protected 
because they are “characteristically intertwined with informative and 
perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for 
particular views on economic, political, or social issues[.]”73 
The State named two governmental interests behind the statute, 
the protection of the public from fraud, and from invasion of privacy.74 
The Court conceded that that these interests were “substantial, “but 
they are only peripherally promoted by the 75-percent 
requirement[.]”75 In analyzing the regulation’s effectiveness in 
promoting the prevention of fraud, the Court concentrated on the fact 
that the regulation held that any organization using more than 25 
percent of its proceeds on fundraising, salaries and overhead was not 
charitable, but commercial, and therefore acted fraudulently in 
promoting itself as a charity.76 This was unconstitutionally overbroad 
because it neglected to account for organizations that are “primarily 
engaged in research, advocacy, or public education” and use donated 
funds to support those causes.77 The restriction lumped charities such 
                                                 
72 Id.; August Meacham, THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS, 12 CommLaw Conspectus 61, 68 (2004). The cases the 
Supreme Court cited as precedent were Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S.52 
(1942); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S.413 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 
105 (1943); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 
516 (1945); Beard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 
425 U.S. 610 (1976). 
73 Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632 
74 Id. at 636. 
75 Id. at 636-39 
76 Id. at 636 
77 Id. at 636-37. The government identified the protection of the public from 
fraud, criminal conduct, and invasions of privacy as the interest to be advanced by 
the seventy-five percent limitation. Conceding these interests were substantial. The 
Court decided they were only "peripherally promoted by  the [seventy-five percent] 
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as these together with solicitors which were in fact using the 
“charitable label as a cloak for profitmaking[.]”78 The Court 
emphasized the importance of narrowly drawing the regulation to 
serve the legitimate interest: “’Broad prophylactic rules in the area of 
free expression are suspect. Precision of regulation must be the 
touchstone.’”79 Additionally, the Court suggested ways in which the 
Village could have protected against fraud in a manner less intrusive to 
free speech; enforcing penal laws against fraud or encouraging 
charitable financial transparency would have protected citizens against 
fraud and avoided any infringements on charitable free speech.80 
The interest in protecting residential privacy was also found to 
be related only indirectly to the regulation, and not narrowly tailored.81 
Those soliciting on behalf of those charities who met the 75-percent 
requirement would not be less intrusive than those representing 
charities who did not meet the requirement.82 The solicitation would 
disturb householders, regardless of which type of charity they 
represented.83 The regulation’s only relation to the protection of 
privacy is that it would reduce the total number of solicitors the 
householder would see, but any prohibition on solicitation would have 
the same effect.84 
                                                                                                                   
requirement," and could be "sufficiently served by measures less destructive of First 
Amendment interests." In analyzing these interests, the distinction between "funds 
for the needy" organizations and "advocacy" organizations was instrumental. 
Concerning the village interest in preventing fraud, the Court observed that the 
assumption that only those charitable organizations able to meet the seventy-five 
percent requirement were non-deceitful unnecessarily crimped the ability of 
advocacy organizations to raise and use donated funds to support research, advocacy 
and public education activities. Edward J. Schoen, Joseph S. Falchek, The Do-Not-
Call Registry Trumps Commercial Speech,  MICH. ST. L. REV. 483, 509-08 (2005). 
78 Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 637. 
79 Id. (quoting  NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). 
80 Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 638 (1980). 
81 Id. at 638 
82 Id.  
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 638.  
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Schaumburg provides significant protection for charitable 
speech. On one level it protects charitable solicitation from regulations 
governing the final use of charitable funds.85 More significantly, 
however, the case creates the level of scrutiny which a content neutral 
regulation on charitable speech must reach in order to be held 
constitutional, and protects against broad prophylactic measures. In 
order for a limitation to stand up to a constitutional challenge, it must 
serve a sufficiently strong governmental interest, and be narrowly 
drawn. . . to serve. . . [that] interest without unnecessarily interfering 
with First Amendment freedoms.”86 Finally, as both the concurrence 
and majority concede, this case holds that charitable speech is a 
protected form of speech subject to a higher form of First Amendment 
protection than that afforded commercial speech.87 
 
2.  Secretary of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson, Co. 
 
      Following Schaumburg, the Court invalidated a Maryland statute 
which prohibited charities from paying solicitors more than 25% of the 
                                                 
85 Schaumburg provides significant protection to charitable organizations and 
professional fundraisers. Charitable solicitations are deemed protected speech under 
the First Amendment, and charitable organizations are accorded equal status under 
the First Amendment whether their purpose is to raise "funds for the needy" or to 
engage in advocacy of ideas and information dissemination. Further, percentage-
based limitations on the ultimate application of charitable donations are considered 
prophylactic, unconstitutional restrictions on free speech, in the absence of a 
demonstration that such limitations are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
government interest. Likewise, criminal prosecutions for fraud or trespass, or 
communications by potential donors that they do not want to be solicited by 
charitable organizations, are deemed less intrusive, more tailored means of 
protecting donors against fraud and invasions of their privacy. Edward J. Schoen, 
Joseph S. Falchek, The Do-Not-Call Registry Trumps Commercial Speech,  MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 483, 510 (2005).  
86 Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 636-37 
(1980). This standard, as the Eighth Circuit notes, is similar to intermediate scrutiny 
review of a content-neutral regulation. Fraternal Order of Police v. Stenehjem, 431 
F.3d 591, 597 (8th Cir. 2005). 
87 Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 773, 791 and at 792 (2006) 
(William, J., concurring). 
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amount raised.88 Under the statute, charitable organizations were 
prohibited from soliciting of any kind if they paid as expenses more 
than 25 percent of the amount raised.89 This statute was similar to the 
one at issue in Schaumburg except for the creation of an administrative 
waiver. The statute permitted the Secretary of State to waive the 
restriction for a specific charity, if that charity could show that the 25 
percent limitation would effectively prevent it from raising 
contributions.90  The primary issue, the Court noted, was whether an 
administrative waiver based on a charity’s demonstration of financial 
need shows a sufficient narrow tailoring of the statute so as to avoid 
the outcome of Schaumburg.91 It was not. 
 Under the statute, the Secretary of State had no discretion to 
waive the 25 percent threshold except for instances involving financial 
need.92 The waiver was restricted to instances of financial necessity 
due to the high cost of raising contributions.93 The waiver provision 
did not provide relief to the charities which were of particular concern 
to the Court in Schaumburg, namely to charitable organizations whose 
costs exceeded the twenty-five percent threshold out of choice.94 
                                                 
88 Sec’y of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984). 
89 Id. at 951. The statute in relevant part stated: 
 (a) A charitable organization other than a charitable salvage organization may 
not pay or agree to pay as expenses in connection with any fund-raising activity a 
total amount in excess of 25 percent of the total gross income raised or received by 
reason of the fund-raising activity. The Secretary of State shall, by rule or regulation 
in accordance with the ‘standard of accounting and fiscal reporting for voluntary 
health and welfare organizations’ provide for the reporting of actual cost, and of the 
allocation of expenses, of a charitable organization into those which are in 
connection with a fund-raising activity and those which are not. The Secretary of 
State shall issue rules and regulations to permit a charitable organization to pay or 
agree to pay for expenses in connection with a fund-raising activity more than 25% 
of its total gross income in those instances where the 25% limitation would 
effectively prevent the charitable organization from raising contributions. 
90 Id. at 951. 
91 Id. at 962. 
92 Id.  
93 Sec’y of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947, 963 (1984). 
94 Id. at 963. 
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Charities whose high costs were due to "’information dissemination, 
discussion and advocacy of public issues,’" were barred from carrying 
on charitable solicitation activities protected by the First 
Amendment.95  
Furthermore, the Court ruled that the statute, like the statute in 
Schaumburg, was too broad and did not accomplish its objective of 
protecting the public against fraud and invasion of privacy.96 By 
punishing charitable organizations with high fundraising costs, the 
statute relies on the “mistaken premise that high solicitation costs are 
an accurate measure of fraud.”97 The statue may prevent some 
charities from the fraudulent misdirection of funds away from its 
purported goals, but this result is “little more than fortuitous.”98 
Equally as possible, is that the statue would restrict First Amendment 
speech that results in high costs, due to the nature of the charity’s 
mission (such as public education, and advocacy), or restrict speech 
which results in high costs simply because of the unpopularity of the 
charity’s goals.99 Finally, the Court found that the statue completely 
failed in its promotion of the government’s goals; the restriction’s 
percentage limitation does nothing to prevent an organization which 
wishes to engage in fraudulent behavior from misdirecting funds 
solicited funds.100 
Munson reiterated the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Schaumburg, that charitable solicitation is a protected form of speech 
and that a restriction on charitable solicitation must serve a sufficiently 
strong governmental purpose, and must be narrowly tailored to 
accomplish that purpose without unnecessarily interfering with 
protected speech.101 
                                                 
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 966. 
97 Id.  
98 Id.  
99 Sec’y of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947, 967 (1984). 
100 Id. 
101 Edward J. Schoen, Joseph S. Falchek, The Do-Not-Call Statute Trumps 
Commercial Speech, MICH. ST. L. REV. 483, 513 (2005); see Richard Steinberg, 
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3.  Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc. 
 
In the final case in the trilogy, the Court dealt with a statute 
aimed not only at the charities directly, but also at the professional 
fundraisers they employed.102 First, the statute prohibited professional 
fundraisers from retaining an "unreasonable" or "excessive" fee, and 
defined a "reasonable fee".103 Reasonable was defined within the 
statute as a percentage of gross revenues raised.104 Fees for 
professional solicitors which exceeded 35% of the amount raised were 
presumed unreasonable, and fees below 20% were presumed 
reasonable.105 Fees falling between 35% and 20% could be deemed 
unreasonable, if the state could show that advocacy or dissemination 
of information was not involved in the professional solicitor’s 
efforts.106 Second, the statute required professional fundraisers to 
disclose to potential donors the identity of the charitable organization 
for whom it worked, and the average percentage of gross receipts 
actually turned over to charities by the fundraiser for all charitable 
solicitations conducted in the State within the previous 12 months.107 
Finally, the statute required professional fundraisers to obtain a license 
before making charitable solicitations.108 All three restrictions were 
held to violate the protections of the first amendment. 
The Court struck down the first restriction, the reasonable fee 
provision, because it was, like the restrictions in Schaumburg and 
Munson, not narrowly tailored to fulfill the statute’s goals of fraud 
prevention and maximizing the funds which the charity would 
                                                                                                                   
Economic Perspectives on Regulation of Charitable Solicitation, 39 CASE W. RES. 
775, 777 n.9 (1989).  
102 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988) 




107 Id. at 786 
108 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 786 (1988). 
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receive.109 Relying heavily on their decisions in Schaumburg and 
Munson the Court once again held “that the solicitation of charitable 
contributions is protected speech[.]”110  
 
As in Schaumburg and Munson, we are unpersuaded by 
the State's argument here that its three-tiered, 
percentage-based definition of "unreasonable" passes 
constitutional muster. Our prior cases teach that the 
solicitation of charitable contributions is protected 
speech, and that using percentages to decide the legality 
of the fundraiser's fee is not narrowly tailored to the 
State's interest in preventing fraud.111 
 
The statute’s three-tiered approach would not logically prevent 
fraud because there was no connection between the percentage of 
funds retained by the fundraiser and fundraising fraud.112 A charity 
might “choose a particular type of fundraising drive, or a particular 
solicitor, expecting to receive a large sum as measured by total dollars 
rather than the percentage of dollars remitted.”113 Or, a charity may 
wish to sacrifice short-term monetary gains in order to “achieve long-
term, collateral, or noncash benefits” such as advocacy or a 
dissemination of information[.]”114 Beyond this, the statute would 
cause an unacceptable chill on certain kinds of charitable speech, 
particularly the dissemination of information and advocacy.115 
Requiring professional fundraisers to potentially litigate any time they 
wished to engage in advocacy or the dissemination of information, and 
to bear the costs of that litigation, might simply result in either driving 
professional fundraisers out of North Carolina or discouraging them 
                                                 
109 Id. at 789. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 793. 
113 Id. at 791-92. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 794. 
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from engaging in those types of charitable campaigns.116 Additionally, 
as with Schaumburg and Munson, the Court found that the goal of 
fraud prevention could be accomplished without restricting free speech 
through the state’s already existing antifraud laws.117  
The Court struck also struck down the mandatory disclosure of 
information restriction. Forcing the commercial telemarketers to 
disclose the percentage of contributions given to the charities for 
which they work requires the telemarketers to engage in speech which 
they would not usually engage in, and is therefore a content-based 
regulation.118 The state’s proffered interest behind the regulation was 
to inform “donors how the money they contribute is spent in order to 
dispel the alleged misperception that the money they give to 
professional fundraisers goes in greater-than-actual proportion to 
benefit charity.”119 In the eyes of the Court, however, this was not a 
sufficiently compelling interest.120 The state presumed that charities 
derive no benefit from money collected but not given to the charity.121 
But this assumption is incorrect because “where the solicitation is 
                                                 
116 “[F]undraisers will be faced with the knowledge that every campaign 
incurring fees in excess of 35%, and many campaigns with fees between 20% and 
35%, will subject them to potential litigation over the "reasonableness" of the fee. 
And, of course, in every such case the fundraiser must bear the costs of litigation and 
the risk of a mistaken adverse finding by the factfinder, even if the fundraiser and the 
charity believe that the fee was in fact fair. This scheme must necessarily chill 
speech in direct contravention of the First Amendment's dictates. See Munson, supra, 
at 969, 104 S.Ct., at 2853; N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279, 84 S.Ct. 
710, 725, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). This chill and uncertainty might well drive 
professional fundraisers out of North Carolina, or at least encourage them to cease 
engaging in certain types of fundraising (such as solicitations combined with the 
advocacy and dissemination of information) or representing certain charities 
(primarily small or unpopular ones), all of which will ultimately ‘reduc[e] the 
quantity of expression.’” Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 
781, 794 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19, 39, (1976)). 
117 Riley, 487 U.S. at 795. 
118 Id. 
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combined with the advocacy and dissemination of information, the 
charity reaps a substantial benefit from the act of solicitation itself.”122 
Moreover, the Court found that less restrictive means which were more 
narrowly tailored could accomplish the statute’s goals.123 For example, 
the state could publish the detailed financial data which fundraisers 
were required to file, or the state could simply enforce its antifraud 
laws to prohibit telemarketers from making false statements or 
obtaining money through deceit.124  
Since this restriction was content-based, the Court analyzed it 
using strict scrutiny, rather than the test outlined in Schaumburg.125 
However, the Court held that a regulation affecting charitable speech 
must be analyzed as such, even if it purports to regulate only 
commercial actors.126 Therefore, as in the case here, where a statute is 
directed only at the commercial telemarketers employed by charities, it 
necessarily affects charitable solicitation, so it must be subject to the 
test for fully protected charitable solicitation.127 
Finally, the court invalidated the third restriction, the licensing 
requirement. While the state has the power license speech, that power 
is not unlimited.128 The licensing requirement was imposed only on 
commercial solicitors, who, while their applications were pending, 
could not engage in charitable solicitation.129 States may impose 
reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions on solicitation through 
                                                 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 800. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 798. 
126 Id. at 796 (quoting Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,  444 
U.S. 620 632 (1980), quoted in Sec’y of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson, Co., 467 
U.S. 947, 959-960 (1984).   
127 “Thus, where, as here, the component parts of a single speech are 
inextricably intertwined, we cannot parcel out the speech, applying one test to one 
phrase and another test to another phrase. Such an endeavor would be both artificial 
and impractical. Therefore, we apply our test for fully protected expression.” Riley, 
487 U.S. at 796. 
128 Id. at 802. 
129 Id. at 801. 
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licensing requirements, however, the state must also explicitly state a 
time limit in which the license application will be decided.130 Because 
the statute in Riley had no provision stating a time in which the 
licensor must either issue the license, or allow the applicant to go to 
court, the Court found the requirement to be unconstitutional.131  
As concurrence correctly argues, this trilogy of Supreme Court 
cases clearly states that charitable solicitation, regardless of its 
commercial undertones, is a protected form of speech, subject to a 
higher form of scrutiny than purely commercial speech.132 
Furthermore, these cases outline the level of protection afforded 
charitable solicitation.133 Specifically, the Court stated: 
 
But even assuming, without deciding, that such speech 
in the abstract is indeed merely “commercial,” we do 
not believe that the speech retains its commercial 
character when it is inextricably intertwined with 
otherwise fully protected speech. Our lodestars in 
deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to a compelled 
statement must be the nature of the speech taken as a 
whole and the effect of the compelled statement 
thereon. This is the teaching of Schaumburg and 
Munson, in which we refused to separate the 
component parts of charitable solicitations from the 
fully protected whole. Regulation of a solicitation ‘must 
be undertaken with due regard for the reality that 
solicitation is characteristically intertwined with 
informative and perhaps persuasive speech . . ., and for 
the reality that without solicitation the flow of such 
information and advocacy would likely cease.134 
 
                                                 
130 Id. at 802. 
131 Id. 
132 Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 792 (2006). 
133 Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 836-37. 
134 Riley, 487 U.S. at 796. 
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According to these cases, nonprofit solicitation must receive 
the highest First Amendment protection, requiring any regulation to be 
narrowly tailored to fulfill a substantial governmental interest.135  
 
B.  Seventh Circuit Case Law 
 
The Seventh Circuit, while not directly facing an opt-in statute 
restricting charitable speech, is not without precedent either in how 
and when it has applied Rowan, or in whether the Circuit has required 
narrow tailoring analysis for other types of restrictions on charitable 
speech.  
First, following Schaumburg the Seventh Circuit “uniformly 
applied the narrow-tailoring requirement to regulations affecting 
charitable speech.”136 In Gresham v. Peterson, the Seventh Circuit 
analyzed a regulation restricting street begging to public places, and 
prohibiting completely “aggressive” panhandling.137  The court found 
                                                 
135 Carter, F.3d 455 at 792; Rita Marie Cain, Nonprofit Solicitation Under the 
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 57 FED. COMM. L.J. 81, 89 (December, 2004). 
136 The concurrence, in footnote 1, lists a number of cases with parentheticals 
in support of this statement, it reads: “See, e.g., Wis. Action Coal. v. City of Kenosha, 
767 F.2d 1248, 1251-59 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that the Supreme Court "has also 
repeatedly stated that a regulation must be narrowly drawn" and applying a narrow-
tailoring analysis); City of Watseka v. Ill. Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 
1552-57 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that the Supreme Court routinely requires that a 
time, place, and manner regulation be "narrowly tailored" and applying a four-part 
test that required consideration of whether the regulation was "narrowly tailored to 
serve the government objective"); Nat'l People's Action v. Vill. of Wilmette, 914 
F.2d 1008, 1012-13 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court has reaffirmed 
"emphatically" that a regulation geared toward protected speech must be narrowly 
tailored and applying such an analysis); Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 905-06 
(7th Cir. 2000) (noting that regulations must be "narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant government interest" and applying such a test). Carter, 455 F.3d at 793. 
137 The statute at issue in Gresham stated:  
It shall be unlawful to engage in an act of panhandling in an 
aggressive manner, including any of the following actions:  
(1) Touching the solicited person without the solicited person's 
consent. 
(2) Panhandling a person while such person is standing in line and 
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that charities and street beggars are indistinguishable in terms of first 
amendment protection of their speech, 138 and, relying on Schaumburg, 
found the statute to be narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
government interest.139 Additionally, the Gresham court recognized 
that the Supreme Court has held that charitable solicitation receives a 
higher level of scrutiny that commercial speech, stating: 
 
The Court placed charitable solicitations by 
organizations in a category of speech close to the heart 
of the First Amendment, and distinguished it from 
"purely commercial speech" which is "primarily 
concerned with providing information about the 
characteristics and costs of goods and services." Id. 
Commercial speech, on the other hand, has been placed 
lower in the First Amendment food chain, somewhere 
between political speech and pornography. It deserves 
protection, but authorities are more free to regulate 
commercial speech than core-value speech.140 
  
“In Watseka, using intermediate scrutiny for a content-neutral 
regulation, the court found the city’s ban on door-to-door solicitation 
during certain parts of the day was not “narrowly tailored to achieve 
                                                                                                                   
waiting  to be admitted to a commercial establishment;  
(3) Blocking the path of a person being solicited, or the entrance to 
any building or vehicle; 
(4) Following behind, ahead or alongside a person who walks 
away from the panhandler after being solicited;  
(5) Using profane or abusive language, either during the 
solicitation or following a refusal to make a donation, or making 
any statement, gesture, or other communication which would cause 
a reasonable person to be fearful or feel compelled; or, 
(6) Panhandling in a group of two (2) or more persons.  
Gresham, 225 F.3d at 901-02. 
138 Id. at 904. 
139 Id. at 905-06. 
140 Id. at 904. 
26
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 11
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss1/11
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 1                           Fall 2006 
 
 306
Watseka’s legitimate objectives.”141 Similarly, in City of Kenosha, the 
court, relying on Schaumburg, held a time restriction on door-to-door, 
charitable solicitation to be constitutional because the “restriction 
[was] narrowly tailored to serve the [protectable and subordinating] 
interest[.]”142 Finally, in Village of Wilmette, in addressing the 
constitutionality of a city ordinance requiring door-to-door solicitors to 
submit fingerprints in order to receive a license to solicit, the court 
found that Supreme Court has “emphatically” reaffirmed the need for 
regulations on protected speech to be narrowly tailored.143 
 Not only has the Seventh Circuit consistently applied the 
narrow tailoring requirement to regulations on charitable speech, but 
also, the court has never used Rowan as a stand-alone balancing test 
either in the commercial or charitable speech context. “Rather, 
consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence, [the Seventh Circuit 
has] limited [its] application of Rowan to the framework of whether 
the regulation was narrowly tailored (or, relatedly, whether the 
government had a sufficiently strong interest in protecting residential 
privacy.)”144  
 In Curtis v. Thompson, the court upheld an Illinois statute 
which prohibited real estate agents from soliciting a homeowner to sell 
or list their property after the homeowner had provided notice that they 
                                                 
141 City of Watseka v. Ill. Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1558 (7th Cir. 
1986) 
142 Wisconsin Action Coalition v. City of Kenosha, 767 F.2d 1248, 1251-59 
(7th Cir. 1985). 
143 Nat’l People’s Action v. Vill. of Wilmette, 914 F.2d 1008, 1012 (7th Cir. 
1990). 
144 Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 794 (7th Cir. 2006) (William, 
J., concurring). Again, the concurrence provides ample authority in support of this 
statement, stating in footnote 5: “See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1202 n.8 
(7th Cir. 1978) (citing to Rowan for the proposition that the ordinances at issue were 
not "appropriately narrow ordinances"); Curtis v. Thompson, 840 F.2d 1291, 1301-
02 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying Rowan to a narrow-tailoring analysis pertaining to a 
commercial speech ordinance); S. Suburban Housing Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. 
of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 892-94 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); Pearson v. Edgar, 153 F.3d 
397, 403-05 (7th Cir. 1998) (same).” Carter, 455 F.3d at 794 (William J., 
concurring). 
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have no desire to sell.145 The statute, like the statute at issue in Rowan 
required an affirmative act by the homeowner, in the form of 
providing notice, in order to receive the protection under the statute.146 
The purpose behind the statute was two-fold, first it was intended to 
prevent blockbusting147, and second it was to protect residential 
privacy.148 Proceeding under the Central Hudson framework, the court 
found the statute did not violate the free speech rights of the 
plaintiffs.149 The Curtis court relied heavily on Rowan in its narrow 
tailoring analysis, and found it to be a “case almost directly on 
point”.150 
In South-Suburban Housing Center v. Greater South Suburban 
Board of Realtors the court again dealt with a restriction on the 
solicitation of real estate listings.151 The municipal ordinance at issue, 
which was similar to the one in Curtis, prohibited any person from 
soliciting an owner of a dwelling to sell, rent, or list the dwelling any 
time after the owner had notified the city clerk of their desire not to be 
solicited.152 The clerk was to maintain a list of owners wishing not to 
be solicited and furnish a copy of the list to real estate firms belonging 
to the local multiple-listing service.153 Like in Curtis, the court 
                                                 
145 Curtis v. Thompson, 840 F.2d 1291, 1293 (1988). 
146 Id. at 1294. 
147 Blockbusting is when a real estate agent attempts to persuade white owners 
to see their home by stating that property prices will lower because people of color 
are moving or have moved into the neighborhood. 
148 Curtis, 840 F.2d at 1293. 
149 Id. at 1299-1305. 
150 Id. at 1301. The Rowan analysis in Curtis did not receive a majority vote, 
but as the court in Pearson v. Edgar, discussed infra, states: 
Our Rowan analysis in Curtis did not garner a majority of votes. 
However, we reaffirmed the Rowan analysis in S. Suburban by a 
unanimous vote, so we will treat the Rowan analysis as if it were 
established by a majority in Curtis. 
Pearson v. Edgar, 153 F.3d 397, 404 (7th Cir. 1997). 
151 S. Suburban Housing Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.3d 
868, 874 (7th Cir. 1991). 
152 Id. at 874-75. 
153 Id. 
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analyzed the restriction under Central Hudson, and, in its narrow 
tailoring analysis, relied heavily on Rowan as an example of a 
narrowly tailored statute, and as evidence of the Court’s high regard 
for the protection of residential privacy.154 Particularly, the court stated 
that “we are convinced that the ordinances at issue here and the statute 
in Rowan are materially indistinguishable for First Amendment 
purposes.”155 The court states: 
 
Both in Rowan and instant case it is the householder 
who is required to take the initiative in determining that 
he does not wish to receive the material. The Rowan 
Court’s broad explanation of a householder’s right to 
exclude unwanted mail fails to eliminate the similarity 
between the content-specific statue in Rowan and the 
content-specific ordinances at issue here. The. . . 
distinction between Rowan allowing “a resident to 
insulate himself from a particular mailer” and the 
authority granted in the ordinances to “exclude an 
entire class of mailers based upon occupation and 
content,” is immaterial.156 
 
Despite this similarity, however, the court does not apply the 
Rowan balancing test, but once again cites to Rowan only in to support 
its analysis under Central Hudson.157  
In Pearson v. Edgar the statute at issue in Curtis was revisited, 
this time with the newly decided Supreme Court case Discovery as a 
guiding factor in analyzing the last two prongs of the Central Hudson 
test.158 Even though the act required an affirmative act by the 
                                                 
154 Id. at 890-94. 
155 Id. at 893  
156 Id. at 894. 
157 Id. at 890-94 
158 Discovery was the Supreme Court case which gave more protection to 
commercial speakers under the Cent. Hudson test.  The Seventh Circuit recounted 
the history of Pearson v. Edgar at the beginning of the opinion, that synopsis states: 
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homeowner as a predicate to receiving protection under the statute, the 
court again refused to apply the Rowan balancing test.159 Using Rowan 
only as an example of a narrowly tailored statute, the Court found this 
restriction on commercial speech violated the First Amendment 
because it was not narrowly tailored to fit the legitimate governmental 
interests.160 Perhaps most significantly, the Pearson court held that its 
                                                                                                                   
The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to halt 
application of the statute during litigation. The district court found 
that the complaint failed to state a claim under the First 
Amendment and that the plaintiffs had no likelihood of success on 
the merits; the district court therefore denied the motion for a 
preliminary injunction. Only plaintiff Curtis pursued an 
interlocutory appeal. We affirmed the district court's denial of the 
preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further 
proceedings in an opinion that became the key to this long running 
saga. See Curtis v. Thompson, 840 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1988). 
The district court read our opinion in Curtis to preclude any chance 
of success for any of the plaintiffs and to establish the law of the 
case, and the district court dismissed the case in its entirety. See 
Pearson v. Thompson, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8970, No. 86 C 
2181, 1989 WL 88367 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 1989). All the plaintiffs 
then appealed, and we affirmed on law of the case grounds. See 
Pearson v. Thompson, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1814, No. 89-3248, 
1992 WL 25349 (7th Cir. Feb. 13, 1992), vacated, Pearson v. 
Edgar, 507 U.S. 1015, 123 L. Ed. 2d 441, 113 S. Ct. 1809 (1993). 
The plaintiffs petitioned for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme 
Court granted the writ, vacated our second opinion, and remanded 
the case to us “for further consideration in light of City of 
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 123 L. Ed. 2d 
99, 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).” Pearson v. Edgar, 507 U.S. 1015, 123 
L. Ed. 2d 441, 113 S. Ct. 1809 (1993). We, in turn, remanded the 
case to the district court “for consideration of the impact of 
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network . . . . The district court should 
conduct an evidentiary hearing to allow the parties to create the 
appropriate record for determining the constitutionality of Ill. Rev. 
Stat. ch. 38 70-51(d) under the new standards set out by Discovery 
Network.” Pearson v. Edgar, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 21600, 1993 
WL 315601 (7th Cir. Aug. 12, 1993).153 F.3d 397, 400. 
Pearson v. Edgar, 153 F.3d 397, 400 (7th Cir. 1998). 
159 Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 795 (7th Cir. 2006). 
160 Pearson, 153 F.3d at 404. 
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reliance on Rowan in its narrow tailoring analysis under Central 
Hudson in its previous cases, Curtis and South Suburban Housing 
Center, was weakened by Discovery’s emphasis on reasonable fit.161 
Pearson then holds that, within the context of narrow tailoring 
analysis, Rowan is not as relevant as it was before Discovery. 
 
C.  The Fourth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits’ Holdings  
on Charitable Speech Restrictions 
 
 The Seventh Circuit stands alone in its current interpretation of 
Rowan. Other circuits which have faced similar challenges to 
commercial and charitable telemarketing restrictions have all read 
Schaumburg, Riley, and Munson to require a narrow tailoring analysis.  
In National Federation of the Blind v. F.T.C, the Fourth Circuit 
faced a challenge by nonprofit groups to the Federal Trade 
Commission’s regulation prohibiting calls to numbers on an opt-in do-
not-call list.162 Like the Indiana statute in Carter, the regulation 
completely prohibited calls by charities using professional 
telemarketers, but not those charities using volunteers or in-house 
employees.163 The regulation, the Telemarketing Sales Rule, created a 
charity specific do-not-call list, which prohibited calls by charities 
using professional telemarketers from calling homes which had 
previously asked not to be called by that specific charity.164 However, 
those charities using volunteers or in-house employees were exempt 
from the act and its restrictions.165 The Fourth Circuit upheld the 
restriction, based on a governing test stemming from Schaumburg, 
Munson, and Riley.166 Under this test, in order for a regulation to 
withstand a constitutional attack, it must “(1) ‘serve a sufficiently 
strong, subordinating interest that the [government] is entitled to 
                                                 
161 Id. 
162 420 F.3d 331, 334 (4th Cir. 2005).  
163 Id. at 335. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 336. 
166 Id. at 338. 
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protect’ and (2) [be] narrowly drawn. . . to serve the interest without 
unnecessarily interfering with the First Amendment freedoms.”167 
The Fourth Circuit relied upon Rowan, but only to show that the 
protection of household privacy is a sufficiently strong governmental 
interest, and that the FTC’s regulation was narrowly tailored because it 
was opt-in.168 According to the court: 
 
The parallels between the law at issue in Rowan and the 
do-not-call list in this case are unmistakable. If 
consumers are constitutionally permitted to opt out of 
receiving mail which can be discarded or ignored, then 
surely they are permitted to opt out of receiving phone 
calls that are more likely to disturb their peace. In this 
way, a do-not-call list is more narrowly tailored to 
protecting privacy than was the law in Rowan.169 
 
Similarly, in Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. F.T.C. the 
Tenth Circuit faced a challenge to the same Federal Trade 
Commission’s regulations, but this case dealt with the restrictions 
imposed on commercial telemarketers.170 Like the restrictions on 
commercial telemarketers in the Indiana Act at issue in Carter, the 
federal Act prohibited commercial telemarketers from calling numbers 
that had been placed on the national do-not-call registry.171 Since it 
was a challenge on commercial restrictions, the court applied Central 
Hudson.172 Again, the Tenth Circuit relied on Rowan, and extensively 
analyzed the decision, but only “within the context of considering 
                                                 
167 Carter, 455 F.3d at 797 (Williams, J., concurring) (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of 
the Blind v. F.T.C., 420 F.3d 331, 338 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Sec’y of Maryland v. 
Joseph H. Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947, 960-61 (1984) (quoting Vill. of Schaumburg 
v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 636-37 (1980))). 
168 Carter, 455 F.3d at 798; Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 420 F.3d at 342.  
169 Carter, 455 F.3d at 798 (Williams, J., concurring) (emphasis excluded) 
(citing Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 420 F.3d at 342). 
170 (“Mainstream Marketing II”), 358 F.3d 1228, 1234 (10th Cir. 2004). 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 1236. 
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whether the federal do-not-call list was narrowly tailored.”173 The 
court found Rowan’s opt-in feature as strong evidence that the federal 
statute was narrowly tailored, specifically the court stated: 
 
Like the do-not-mail regulation approved in Rowan, the 
national do-not-call registry does not itself prohibit any 
speech. Instead, it merely “permits a citizen to erect a 
wall. . . that no advertiser may penetrate without his 
acquiescence.” See Rowan 397 U.S. at 738, 90 S.Ct. 
1484. almost by definition, the do-not-call regulations 
block calls that would constitute unwanted intrusions 
into the privacy of consumers who have signed up for 
the list. Moreover, it allows consumers who feel 
susceptible to telephone fraud or abuse to ensure that 
most commercial callers will not have an opportunity to 
victimize them. Under the circumstances we address in 
this case, we conclude that the do-not-call registry’s 
opt-in feature renders it a narrowly tailored commercial 
speech regulation.174 
 
 Perhaps most significantly, in a “precursor case to Mainstream 
Marketing II, the Tenth Circuit cited to [The Seventh Circuit] decision 
in Pearson, noting that ‘[o]ther courts have relied on Rowan’s analysis 
in finding that similar mechanisms of private choice in solicitation 
restrictions weigh in favor of finding a ‘reasonable fit[,]’ and held that 
‘Rowan demonstrates that the element of private choice in an opt-in 
feature is relevant for purposes of analyzing ‘reasonable fit’’”175.  
Finally, in Fraternal Order of Police v. Stenehjem, the Eighth 
Circuit confronted a North Dakota statute remarkably like the Indiana 
                                                 
173 Carter, 455 F.3d at 795 (Williams, J., concurring) (citing see Mainstream 
Marketing II, 358 F.3d at 1243-44). 
174 Mainstream Marketing II, 358 F.3d at 1244-45. 
175 Carter, 455 F.3d at 795-96 (William, J., concurring) (citing F.T.C. v. 
Mainstream Marketing, Inc. (“Mainstream Marketing I”), 345 F.3d 850, 856 (10th 
Cir. 2003) (citing Anderson v. Treadwell, 294 F.3d 453, 462-63 (2d Cir. 2002); 
Pearson v. Edgar, 153 F.3d 397, 400, 404 (7th Cir. 1998))). 
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statute at issue in Carter. Using the test outlined in Schaumburg, the 
court upheld a restriction on charitable phone solicitation.176 The 
North Dakota statute prohibited charitable solicitation by professional 
telemarketers, but granted an exemption for calls made by volunteers 
or in-house employees.177 Again, after finding the statute content 
                                                 
176 Fraternal Order of Police v. Stenehjem, 431 F.3d 591 (8th Cir. 2005). 
177 Id.; Carter, 455 F.3d at 797. The North Dakota Statute in 
relevant part states: 
In this chapter, unless the context or subject matter otherwise 
requires, the terms shall have the meanings as follows: 
1. "Automatic dialing-announcing device" means a device that 
selects and dials telephone numbers and that, working alone or in 
conjunction with other equipment, disseminates a prerecorded or 
synthesized voice message to the telephone number called. 
2. "Caller" means a person, corporation, firm, partnership, 
association, or legal or commercial entity that attempts to contact, 
or that contacts, a subscriber in this state by using a telephone or a 
telephone line. 
3. "Caller identification service" means a telephone service that 
permits telephone subscribers to see the telephone number of 
incoming telephone calls. 
4. "Established business relationship" means a relationship 
between a seller and consumer based on a free trial newspaper 
subscription or on the consumer's purchase, rental, or lease of the 
seller's goods or services or a financial transaction between the 
consumer and seller, within the twenty-four months immediately 
preceding the date of a telemarketing call. 
5. "Message" means any telephone call, regardless of its content. 
6. "Subscriber" means a person who has subscribed to residential 
telephone services from a telephone company or the other persons 
living or residing with the subscribing person, or a person who has 
subscribed to wireless or mobile telephone services. 
7. "Telephone solicitation" means any voice communication over a 
telephone line for the purpose of encouraging charitable 
contributions, or the purchase or rental of, or investment in, 
property, goods, services, or merchandise, including as defined in 
subsection 3 of section 51-15-03, whether the communication is 
made by a live operator, through the use of an automatic dialing-
announcing device, or by other means. Telephone solicitation does 
not include communications: 
a. To any subscriber with that subscriber's prior express written 
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neutral based on Ward, the Eighth Circuit found that “the appropriate 
[test] for regulation of professional charitable solicitation is derived 
from [Schaumburg].”178 Citing previous Eighth Circuit precedent, the 
court explained that Schaumburg required an inquiry into: “(a) 
whether the State had a sufficient or ‘legitimate’ interest; (b) whether 
the interest identified was ‘significantly furthered’ by a narrowly 
                                                                                                                   
request, consent, invitation, or permission. 
b. By or on behalf of any person with whom the subscriber has an 
established personal or business relationship. 
c. By or on behalf of a charitable organization that is exempt from 
federal income taxation under section 501 of the Internal Revenue 
Code, but only if the following applies: 
(1) The telephone call is made by a volunteer or employee of the 
charitable organization; and 
(2) The person who makes the telephone call immediately discloses 
the following information upon making contact with the consumer: 
(a) The person's true first and last name; and 
(b) The name, address, and telephone number of the charitable 
organization. 
d. By or on behalf of any person whose exclusive purpose is to poll 
or solicit the expression of ideas, opinions, or votes, unless the 
communication is made through an automatic dialing-announcing 
device in a manner prohibited by section 51-28-02. 
e. By the individual soliciting without the intent to complete, and 
who does not in fact complete, the sales presentation during the 
call, but who will complete the sales presentation at a later face-to-
face meeting between the individual solicitor or person who makes 
the initial call and the prospective purchaser. 
f. By or on behalf of a political party, candidate, or other group 
with a political purpose, as defined in section 16.1-08.1-01. 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-28-01 (year). The North Dakota Act also makes the 
following prohibitions: 
A caller may not make or cause to be made any telephone 
solicitation to the telephone line of any subscriber in this state 
who, for at least thirty-one days before the date the call is made, 
has been on the do-not-call list established and maintained or used 
by the attorney general under section 51- 28-09 or the national do-
not-call registry established and maintained by the federal trade 
commission under title 16, Code of Federal Regulations, part 310. 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-28-06 (emphasis added). 
178 Stenehjem, 431 F.3d at 597 
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tailored regulation; and (c) whether the regulation substantially limited 
charitable solicitations.179 Following in the steps of the Fourth and 
Tenth Circuits, the Eighth Circuit cited Rowan extensively, but again, 
only in an effort to establish the legitimate interest of the State in 
protecting residential privacy, and that the opt-in nature of the statute 
made the statute narrowly tailored.180 
 
III. THE MAJORITY MISINTERPRETS CASE LAW BY RELYING ON ROWAN 
  
It was against this backdrop of Supreme Court precedent and 
subsequent Circuit Court interpretations that the Seventh Circuit 
decided Carter. Rather than apply the scrutiny for charitable 
restrictions outlined in Schaumburg, the Court relies on the balancing 
test of Rowan. This was the incorrect decision because, to begin with, 
Rowan dealt with a commercial restriction, and precedent clearly 
shows that commercial and charitable speech are subject to different 
levels of scrutiny. Additionally, the court, in coming to their decision, 
misread, or in some cases ignored, Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit 
authority, as well as the persuasive holdings of its sister courts. 
 
A.  Rowan Deals With A Regulation on Commercial Speech, 
Not Charitable Speech 
 
As a primary issue, Rowan did not deal with charitable 
solicitation. Rowan prohibited the sending of commercial mailings. 
This, as the concurrence correctly states, is a significant difference 
given the fact that both the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit 
have held that restrictions on charitable speech receive greater 
protection than restrictions on commercial speech.181 Speech aimed at 
soliciting funds can be divided into two categories. Commercial 
solicitation, whose expression is related solely to the economic interest 
                                                 
179  Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 793 (7th Cir. 2006); Gresham 
v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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of the speaker182, and charitable solicitation, which has, as one of its 
goals economic benefit, but which is characteristically intertwined 
with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for 
particular causes or for particular views on economic, political, or 
social issues. These two categories have separate levels of scrutiny, 
neither of which is the Rowan balancing test.  
As explained supra, the test which should be used for 
restrictions on charitable solicitation is the one outlined in 
Schaumburg, and Central Hudson, decided ten years after Rowan, 
formulated the test which governs commercial restrictions.183 As the 
concurrence correctly points out, the Central Hudson test is similar to 
the Schaumburg test, yet charitable solicitations receive heightened 
scrutiny and, “unlike commercial regulations, are presumptively 
invalid if they are not content neutral.”184 “[W]hatever Rowan has to 
say regarding the test applicable to First Amendment challenges 
involving commercial speech must be filtered through subsequent 
Supreme Court authority. . . [, the Rowan] test is no longer the 
controlling law even in the commercial speech arena, much less in the 
more highly protected charitable speech context.”185 Thus, even in the 
context of regulations on commercial speech, Rowan is not the 
controlling test.  
Not only did the Seventh Circuit misapply an invalid 
commercial test to a restriction on charitable speech, but also, by 
ignoring the difference between commercial speech and charitable 
speech, the majority has effectively stripped the plaintiffs of their right 
to have their case analyzed under the heightened level of scrutiny 
afforded charitable speech.  
                                                 
182 Cent. Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 561 (1980). 
183 447 U.S. 557. 
184 Carter, 455 F.3d at 794 n.3 (citing Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a 
Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 636-37 (1980); Gresham, 225 F.3d at 904; Stenehjem, 
431 F.3d 59). 
185 Carter, 455 f.3d 783, 794 (see Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565) (William, J., 
concurring). 
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B.  The Majority Ignores Supreme Court Precedent 
 
 Rowan has not become obsolete, in fact, as the majority 
correctly states, it has never been explicitly overruled by the Supreme 
Court.186 It has been cited frequently by both the Supreme Court and 
Seventh Circuit, but, as the majority concedes, only in support of the 
state’s great interest in protecting residential privacy, or in narrow 
tailoring analysis.187 In order to apply Rowan in the manner it did, the 
court had misinterpret Supreme Court precedent. 
 As explained above, Schaumburg undoubtedly held that 
charitable solicitation is under the protection of the first amendment. 
“Charitable solicitations. . . are within the protections of the First 
Amendment.”188 Further, the Court in Schaumburg was well aware of 
the Rowan case, and cited to it, but not in support of a balancing 
test.189 Instead, the Court cited to Rowan during its narrow tailoring 
analysis, as an example of less intrusive methods of protecting 
residential privacy than through the state’s method at issue in 
Schaumburg.190 The Schaumburg test was solidified as the governing 
test for regulations affecting charitable solicitation by the following 
cases Munson and Riley. In both these cases the Court faced 
challenges to regulations on charitable solicitation, and while the state 
interests behind the regulations were legitimate, they failed because 
                                                 
186 Carter, 455 F.3d at 789. 
187 Id. 
188 Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 633 (1980); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of 
N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 789 (1988) (applying the test outlined in Schaumburg and 
stating “Our prior cases teach that the solicitation of charitable contributions is 
protected speech”). 
189 Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 639. 
190 Specifically, the Court stated: “Other provisions of the ordinance, which are 
not challenged here, such as the provision permitting homeowners to bar solicitors 
from their property by posting signs reading ‘No Solicitors or Peddlers Invited.’ § 
22-24, suggest the availability of less intrusive and more effective measures to 
protect privacy.” Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 633 (citing Rowan v. Post Office Dep’t., 
397 U.S. 728 (1970)). 
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they were not narrowly tailored.191 Under Rowan, narrow tailoring 
analysis is not required, but in its narrow tailoring analyses in 
subsequent cases the Court has cited to Rowan frequently.192 In fact, 
the Supreme Court has never used Rowan in support of a stand-alone 
balancing test, but has limited Rowan’s application to either 
“establish[ing] the significance of residential privacy interests and/or 
to address the narrow tailoring or least restrictive means 
requirements.”193 
The majority dismisses the concurrence’s argument that 
Supreme Court precedent, specifically Schaumburg, establishes the 
test for restrictions on charitable solicitation by stating that in 
Schaumburg: 
 
[T]he Court evaluated an ordinance that would forbid 
certain charities from soliciting door-to-door or in public 
streets. The Court specifically noted that the statute was 
                                                 
191 See Sec’y of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947, 966-67 
(1984) and Riley, 487 U.S. at 788-803. 
192 In footnote 4, the concurrence cites examples of the Supreme Court using 
Rowan only in narrow tailoring analysis or in support of the state’s legitimate 
purpose in protecting residential privacy:  
See, e.g., Vill. of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 639 (noting the interest 
in residential privacy and citing Rowan within a narrow-tailoring 
analysis); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of 
N.Y.., 447 U.S. 530, 542 n.11, 100 S. Ct. 2326, 65 L. Ed. 2d 319 
(1980) (same); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471, 100 S. Ct. 
2286, 65 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1980) (citing Rowan to establish the 
substantial interest in residential privacy); Bolger v. Youngs Drug 
Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72, 77-78, 103 S. Ct. 2875, 77 L. Ed. 
2d 469(1983) (same); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 482-85, 108 
S. Ct. 2495, 101 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1988) (same); United States v. 
Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814-15, 120 S. Ct. 
1878, 146 L. Ed. 2d 865(2000) (citing Rowan within a least-
restrictive-means analysis); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 717-
18, 720, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 147 L. Ed. 2d 597 (2000) (citing Rowan 
within the context of a narrow-tailoring analysis). 
Carter, 455 F.3d at 794 n.4. 
193 Id. at 794. 
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“not directed to the unique privacy interests of persons 
residing in their homes because it applies not only to 
door-to-door solicitation, but also to solicitation on 
public streets and public ways.”194 
 
This argument, however, fails because the quote the majority 
used in support of its dismissal of Schaumburg discussed whether the 
restrictions were narrowly tailored. In Schaumburg the Court stated 
that the 75% requirement was not narrowly tailored because it was 
related to the protection of privacy “in only the most indirect of 
ways.”195 The restrictions imposed by the statute were only 
peripherally aimed at protecting privacy, since “householders are 
equally disturbed by solicitation on behalf of organizations satisfying 
the 75% requirement as they are by solicitation on behalf of other 
organizations”, and because it is directed at both door-to-door 
solicitation and solicitation on public streets.196 Schaumburg 
distinguished Rowan only to illustrate a statute which is narrowly 
tailored to protect residential privacy, not in an effort to establish the 
validity of the Rowan balancing test. 
 
C.  The Majority in Carter Ignores Seventh Circuit Precedent 
 
The majority in Carter similarly ignores Seventh Circuit 
precedent. Following Schaumburg the Seventh Circuit “uniformly 
applied the narrow-tailoring requirement to regulations affecting 
charitable speech.”197 However, in the opinion the court does not even 
address Gresham, Watseka, City of Kenosha, or Village of Wilmette, 
all Seventh Circuit cases dealing with various restrictions on charitable 
speech, and all requiring narrow tailoring analysis.198 Presumably, the 
court rejects these cases for the same reason it rejected the Supreme 
                                                 
194 Id. at 789 (quoting Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 638-39). 
195 Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 638.  
196 Id. 
197 Carter, 455 F.3d at 793. 
198 The facts and holdings of these cases are recounted supra. 
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Court’s decision in Schaumburg, namely that the court has not been 
presented with an “opt-in statute that applies only to private residences 
in a manner that effectively protects residential privacy.”199 Since the 
majority does not address these cases, it is difficult to guess exactly 
why they dismissed previous Seventh Circuit cases, however, the 
argument for dismissing Schaumburg fails for the same reason 
outlined supra. 
Beyond Seventh Circuit precedent concerning charitable 
restrictions, the majority also dismisses the Seventh Circuit case law 
concerning opt-in commercial restrictions, a situation where it has 
consistently applied the narrow tailoring requirement.200 In fact, when 
dealing with a commercial restriction, the court has never used Rowan 
as a stand-alone balancing test. “Rather, consistent with Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, [the Seventh Circuit has] limited [its] application 
of Rowan to the framework of whether the regulation was narrowly 
tailored (or, relatedly, whether the government had a sufficiently 
strong interest in protecting residential privacy.)”201  
For challenges to commercial speech restrictions, the Seventh 
Circuit has continually held that Rowan is indeed relevant, but only 
within the framework of the subsequent test laid out by the Supreme 
Court in Central Hudson. In Curtis, Rowan was “almost directly on 
point”202, and in South Suburban Housing Center, the statue at issue 
and the statute in Rowan were “materially indistinguishable for First 
                                                 
199 Carter, 455 F.3d at 789. 
200 See the Seventh Circuit history supra. 
201 Carter, 455 F.3d at 794. Again, the concurrence provides ample authority in 
support of this statement, stating in footnote 5:  
See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1202 n.8 (7th Cir. 1978) 
(citing to Rowan for the proposition that the ordinances at issue 
were not "appropriately narrow ordinances"); Curtis v. Thompson, 
840 F.2d 1291, 1301-02 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying Rowan to a 
narrow-tailoring analysis pertaining to a commercial speech 
ordinance); S. Suburban Housing Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. 
of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 892-94 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); Pearson 
v. Edgar, 153 F.3d 397, 403-05 (7th Cir. 1998) (same). 
Carter, 455 F.3d at 794 n. 5. 
202 Curtis v. Thompson, 935 F.2d 1291, 1300-01 (7th. Cir. 1988). 
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Amendment purposes”203, but in both cases the court not only refused 
to use the Rowan balancing test, but cited to Rowan frequently only as 
support for its analysis under the Central Hudson test. Additionally, in 
Pearson, the Seventh Circuit declared its reliance on Rowan in its 
narrow tailoring analysis and discussion of legitimate state interests 
“weakened” by the subsequent Supreme Court case Discovery.204 
In a footnote, the majority dismisses the argument that Pearson 
rejected the Rowan framework.205 The majority noted that Pearson 
distinguished the statute at issue from the statute in Rowan.206 Rowan, 
was not completely analogous to Pearson, the majority argues, 
because in Pearson the homeowner could not “ban any bothersome 
solicitation but only real estate solicitation”, whereas in Rowan, the 
homeowner “could prevent any material from entering his home[.]”207 
                                                 
203 S. Suburban Housing Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban 935 F.2d 868, 893 (1991). 
204 Pearson v. Edgar, 153 F.3d 397, 404. 
205 The footnote stated: 
In that case [Pearson], the statute in question forbade real estate 
agents from "solicit[ing] an owner of residential property to sell or 
list such residential property at any time after such person or 
corporation has notice that such owner does not desire to sell such 
residential property." Pearson, 153 F.3d 397 at 399. Notably, this 
statute does not limit its ban to times when the homeowner is 
inside the home that he or she owns. Perhaps that is why the 
district court in that case found that the state had produced "no 
evidence . . . that real estate solicitation harms or threatens to harm 
residential privacy." Id. at 404. We noted in that case that the 
Rowan test was not applicable to such an underbroad statute, even 
though the statute was of an opt in nature. Id. at 404 ("Here the 
state, not the homeowner, has made the distinction between real 
estate solicitations and other solicitations without a logical 
privacy-based reason." (emphasis added)). Therefore, we cannot 
agree with our concurring colleague that Pearson rejected the 
Rowan framework with respect to an opt-in statute that is not 
underbroad and is confined to communications aimed solely at a 
residence. 
Carter, 455 F.3d at 790. 
206 Id. 
207 Pearson, 153 F.3d at 404. 
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“[T]he Rowan test was not applicable to such an underbroad statute, 
even though the statute was of an opt in nature.”208  
The majority, however, fails to realize that this exact argument 
could be used to distinguish Carter from Rowan. The homeowner in 
Carter can not ban any bothersome telemarketing call; newspapers, 
real estate and insurance agents, calls soliciting political contributions, 
and charities using in-house employees or volunteers are all exempt 
from the do-not-call list.209  
 
D. Other Circuits Have Analyzed Restrictions Similar to the One at 
Issue in Carter and Have Not Used the Test Outlined in Rowan 
 
Besides incorrectly distinguishing Supreme Court precedent, 
the Seventh Circuit quickly dismisses the rulings of the Fourth, Eighth 
and Tenth Circuits.210 The majority in Carter, in an effort to explain 
why their sister circuits opted for more traditional methods of review 
states: “[n]either the Eighth Circuit nor the Tenth Circuit directly 
addressed a Rowan argument similar to the one the State presses here. 
Instead they reversed by employing more standard First Amendment 
analysis.”211 This statement is true, but misleading.212 In Stenehjem, an 
amicus brief filed by the Indiana Attorney General urged the Eighth 
Circuit to adopt a Rowan balancing test, yet unsurprisingly the court 
declined and analyzed the restrictions under the test on charitable 
restrictions outlined in Schaumburg, and cited to Rowan only as 
support that an opt-in feature helps to show the statute is narrowly 
tailored.213   
                                                 
208 Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 790. 
209 Id. at 784. The concurrence makes this exact argument in response to the 
majority’s determination that the Act places the Indiana Attorney General in a 
“ministerial” role. Id. at 796. The discussion of this argument is dealt with below. 
210 Id. at 788. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 797 (Williams J. concurring). 
213 Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 798 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(Williams, J., concurring) (citing Brief for State of Indiana et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Appellant, at 2, 13). 
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Similarly, in Mainstream Marketing II, several states 
supporting the federal regulations on commercial telemarketers filed 
amicus briefs arguing that Rowan created a balancing test.214 Not 
surprisingly the Tenth Circuit chose not to adopt Rowan’s balancing 
test, but instead employed the test outlined in Central Hudson for 
restrictions on commercial speech.215  
Additionally all three Circuits addressed Rowan and relied on it 
in support of their respective narrow tailoring analyses, at the very 
least the Eighth, Tenth and Fourth Circuits were aware of the 
balancing test in Rowan, and consciously choose not to accept it.216 
“Thus, at a minimum , these circuits did not interpret Rowan as 
requiring nothing more than a balancing of interests. More likely, they 
appropriately disregarded the states’ request for a truncated balancing-
of-interest test and instead applied Rowan solely within the constraints 
created by subsequent Supreme Court Authority.”217 
 
E.  The Majority’s Use of “Underbroad” is Misplaced and Confusing 
 
 After misinterpreting case law and applying Rowan, a 
case which requires no narrow tailoring analysis, the majority 
proceeded to analyze the statute under the “reasonable fit” 
doctrine, outlined in a manner which resembles narrow 
tailoring analysis.218 
 
Once we have decided to apply the Rowan analysis, it 
would seem the case is resolved, since the Supreme 
                                                 
214 Carter, 455 F.3d at 798 (citing Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. 
(“Mainstream Marketing II”), 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004) and Brief for State of 
California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants in Case No. 03-1429 and 
Supporting appellees in Case No. 03-9571 at 1-3, Mainstream Marketing Services, 
Inc., 358 F.3d 1228 (Nos. 03-1429, 03-6258, 03-9571, 03-9594). 
215 Carter, 455 F.3d at 798 (citing Mainstream Marketing II, 358 F.3d at 1242-
44. 
216 Id. at 798 (William, J., concurring). 
217 Id.  
218 Id. at 790-91. 
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Court has already made clear that citizens in their own 
homes have a stronger interest in being free from 
unwanted communication than a speaker has in 
speaking in a manner that invades residential privacy. 
However, the Plaintiffs strenuously argue that the Act is 
underbroad and therefore prohibited under Discovery 
Network. We agree that if the Act was so underbroad as 
to fail to materially advance the State’s interest in 
residential privacy, Plaintiffs might prevail even under 
Rowan.219 
 
 The majority’s reliance on Discovery is confusing, given that 
Discovery was a case analyzing a restriction on commercial speech, 
and was decided using the Central Hudson framework.220 
Additionally, Discovery, and its predecessor Fox, analyze the term 
“reasonable fit” within the context of the last two prongs of the 
Central Hudson test which both deal with narrow tailoring analysis.221 
This makes the majority’s refusal to use proper narrow tailoring 
analysis even more confusing. Furthermore, Carter dealt with a 
restriction on charitable speech, and Discovery has not been cited, 
either by the Supreme Court or the Seventh Circuit, in the narrow 
tailoring analysis of a restriction on charitable speech. 
 Adding to the confusion is the majority’s reliance, within its 
“underbroad” analysis, on Hill v. Colorado,222 a case which upheld a 
statute that “prohibited knowingly approaching within eight feet of 
another person, without that person’s consent, ‘for the purpose of 
passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral 
protest, education, or counseling with such person. . . ‘ within 
                                                 
219 Id.  
220 Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 416 (1993) 
221 Id.  
222 The majority states: “the Act’s legitimacy is bolstered by the Supreme 
Court holding in Hill v. Colorado.” Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 790. 
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designated areas surrounding health care clinics.”223 The Supreme 
Court held the statute to be constitutional because it was a content 
neutral, valid time, place, and manner restriction, and was narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant and legitimate governmental interests.224 
The majority in Carter, while neglecting to engage in a proper narrow 
tailoring analysis, cites to two commercial restriction cases (Discovery 
and Hill) in support of its underbroad analysis, both of which engage 
in extensive narrow tailoring analysis. 
 
IV.  THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT INCORRECTLY SEES INDIANA’S STATUTE  
AS GIVING ONLY MINISTERIAL POWER TO THE  
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL 
  
Even if the court in Carter had not misinterpreted Supreme 
Court and Seventh Circuit precedent, the use of Rowan’s balancing 
test would still be incorrect. In Rowan, the Court’s decision to weigh 
in favor of the homeowner, relied heavily on the plenary power of the 
homeowner under the act, and the affirmative action required by the 
homeowner. The opinion extensively analyzed the legislative history 
and prior versions of the act. A prior version of the act could have 
been read to prohibit only future mailings from the sender, or “future 
mailings of similar materials.”225 “The section as originally reported 
by the House Committee prohibited ‘further mailings of such 
pandering advertisements’ s 4009(a), ‘further mailings of such matter,’ 
s 4009(b), and ‘any further mailings of pandering advertisements,’ s 
4009(c).226 This prior version would have taken discretion away from 
the householder by interposing the “Postmaster General between the 
sender and the addressee and, at least, creat[ed] the appearance if not 
                                                 
223 The purpose of the statute was intended to shelter women visiting abortion 
clinics from unwanted encounters with abortion protestors. Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. 
Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 790 (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 706 (2000)). 
224 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725 (2000). 
225 Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 732 (1970). 
226 Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 90-722, at 125 (1967)). 
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the substance of governmental censorship.”227 The final version of the 
act, however, resolved any constitutional issues by giving the 
householder “complete unfettered discretion in electing whether or not 
he desired to receive further material from a particular sender.”228 The 
Court found that the opt-in nature of the act effectively permitted “a 
citizen to erect a wall that no advertiser may penetrate without his 
acquiescence.”229 This “wall” could essentially block out an unlimited 
amount of commercial mailings the homeowner deemed undesirable. 
Because the act required simply the homeowner to state that in her 
subjective viewpoint, the mailings were erotic in nature, the 
homeowner could conceivably “prohibit the mailing of a dry goods 
catalog because he objects to the contents.”230 This sweeping power, 
along with the required affirmative action of opting-in by the 
homeowner placed the Postmaster General in a “ministerial” role. The 
act did not require the Postmaster General to decide which of the 
sender’s mailings were erotic, but simply carried out the wishes of the 
homeowner, making it only an enforcing or ministerial role. 
In an effort to analogize the Indiana statute to Rowan, the 
majority concentrates on the “ministerial” evaluation, and reviews 
extensively the Supreme Court’s legislative history examination in 
Rowan.231 The calls which were exempt were well defined and 
involved little discretion to decide if a call was placed by a 
professional telemarketer on behalf of a charity, or by a volunteer or 
in-house employee of the charity.232 The majority concluded that the 
role of the Indiana Attorney General was more analogous to the 
ministerial role of the Postmaster General.233  
                                                 
227 Rowan, 397 U.S. at 735. 
228 Id. at 734. 
229 Id. at 738 
230 Id. 
231 Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 788-89 (7th Cir. 2006). 
232 Id. at 789. 
233 The Seventh Circuit concluded that: 
[T]he Act places the Attorney General of Indiana in a ‘ministerial’ 
role more analogous to that of the Postmaster General in the final 
legislation in Rowan than that act’s objectionable predecessor. The 
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The majority’s concentration on the ministerial role is 
misplaced.234 The majority’s reasoning that the Attorney General, like 
the Postmaster General, is given sole discretion to decide only if the 
call was placed by a charity’s volunteer or in-house employee, or if it 
was placed by a professional telemarketing employee on behalf of the 
charity, is erroneous because it considers only the state’s involvement 
in enforcing the statute.235 While the Act in Rowan was limited in 
language to material that the homeowner found erotic or sexually 
arousing, there was no objective test which could prevent the 
homeowner for prohibiting any commercial mailing as long as they 
deemed sexually arousing.236 By allowing the homeowner complete 
control over what material could be prohibited from entering the 
household Act at issue in Rowan truly allowed the homeowner 
complete control.237 In contrast, the Indiana statute at issue in Carter 
left exemptions for phone calls which the homeowner could not elect 
to block.238 The majority ignored the fact that the actual passage of the 
law with “numerous exemptions is an act of immersing itself in the 
regulation of the different forms of telemarketing speech.”239 By 
creating exceptions to the law, Indiana created telemarketing calls 
                                                                                                                   
telephone calls that the Attorney General must allow to be placed 
to numbers on the do-not-call list are very well defined. For 
example, it involves little discretion to decide if the call was placed 
on behalf of a tax-exempt charity, or if the person who placed the 
call was a volunteer or employee of that charity. We therefore 
disagree with the view that Rowan is inapplicable merely because 
the Act imposes well-defined restrictions on precisely what 
protections from unwanted communication a residential phone 
customer may receive by opting in to the do-not-call list. 
 Id. 
234 Id. at 796. 
235 Id. 
236 Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 732 (1970). 
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239 Carter, 455 F.3d at 796 
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which the homeowners could not block.240 Therefore, the total power 
to restrict all intrusions into the home which was enjoyed by the 




Simply because the concurrence and majority come to the same 
decision does not make the Carter court’s oversights irrelevant. Under 
the majority’s test, there was no need to analyze the regulation for 
content neutrality. If a restriction on charitable speech regulates on the 
basis of content, then it is not a content neutral restriction and must be 
analyzed under strict scrutiny.241 The plaintiff argues that the act is 
“content-based regulation because its applicability requires analysis of 
the content of the message in order to determine to which callers it 
applies.”242  
 
“If one must necessarily look at the content of the 
speech to determine whether the law applies, then the 
law is content-based.” Ark. Writers’ Project Inc. v. 
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987). For example, a call 
by one of the charities to educate a consumer is not 
banned but if the call ends with a request for a donation 
                                                 
240 Unlike in Rowan, the state here has carved out particular categories of calls 
the homeowner cannot block. These state-created carve-outs include not only 
charitable calls made by volunteers and employees, but also certain calls by 
newspaper organizations, real estate agents, and insurance agents. Thus, the 
homeowner here does not have the plenary power to restrict all intrusions as the 
homeowner could in Rowan. Instead, Indiana has actively immersed itself in 
regulating the forms of telemarketing speech that homeowners are allowed to block: 
a homeowner has unfettered discretion to block calls from professional 
telemarketers, but lacks such discretion when it comes to, for example, calls initiated 
by employees or volunteers of charities. Id. at 796 (Williams, J. concurring). 
241 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 789 (1988); Vill. of 
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980); see Sec’y of 
State of Maryland v. Munson, 467 U.S. 947 (1984). 
242  Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, at 21, Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, No.05-
3995 (7th Cir. July 28, 2006). 
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it is banned. If that same call was placed by a volunteer 
or a paid charitable employee it is exempt. An outside 
fundraiser, paid the same wage, would be banned from 
this speech. 
The Act applies its restrictions based on the content of 
the banned calls and the identity of the caller. A statute 
that defines the speech it regulates by content, or 
particular speakers, is evaluated as a content-based 
restriction on speech. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 811-12.243 
 
 The concurrence rejects this content-based argument, stating: 
“Although the question of whether the Indiana Act is a content neutral 
regulation is a close one, it is nonetheless a ‘regulation that serves 
purposes unrelated to the content of expression . . . even if it has 
incidental effect on certain speakers or messages but not others.’”244 
Analyzing the restriction for its content-neutrality is a hurdle which the 
restriction must pass in order to be found constitutional.  While the 
argument fails, and the concurrence eventually arrives at the same 
conclusion as the majority the restriction was at least analyzed for 
content-neutrality. 
The majority ignores the weight of Supreme Court precedent, 
Seventh Circuit precedent, and the persuasive arguments of its sister 
circuits,245 but is it relevant that the majority used the wrong test. The 
concurrence, the Fourth, and the Eighth Circuits, all using a higher 
level of scrutiny reached the same conclusion as the majority. The 
result may have been the same, but what is relevant is that when a 
government seeks to burden a right as fundamental as free speech, it is 
the court’s duty to analyze that regulation in the manner dictated by 
precedent. In this case, while the majority and concurrence reached the 
same conclusion, the majority’s test allowed for a less strict review. 
                                                 
243 Id. at 21-22. 
244 Nat’l Coal. of Prayer, 455 F.3d at 798-99 (citing Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791). 
245 See Nat’l Fed’n for the Blind v. F.T.C, 420 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2005); 
Fraternal Order of Police v. Stenehjem, 431 F.3d 591 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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